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Abstract
The present concern over the number, quality, and
appropriateness of surveys being used to collect research
data, especially for policy analysis, has led to questions
concerning the need for, and alternatives to, survey method-
ologies. This paper presents an analysis of the drawbacks
to the use of surveys in economic research and suggestions
for ways they may be more profitably incorporated in future
research. Examples of such innovative strategies from the
economic research area are discussed.
I.
Introduction
There seems to be an increasing reliance on the use of
surveys to collect data to be used in a wide variety of research
settings. In many cases the research results are to be used to
derive (or support) policy decisions. The questions which arise,
and which motivate these remarks, are: "Is survey research
necessary?"; "Is it cost-effective?"; "What alternatives exist?";
and "How might they be done better, when necessary?".
II
.
Economic Research and Use of Survey Methods
There exist two major ways economists analyse "what people
do" in order to predict what their future economic behavior will
be:
a) They assume that there exists a utility function with
certain properties which embody the important decision variables
and parameters, and which relates their combination to levels of
consumer satisfaction; then they predict on the basis of changes
in parameters through analytical manipulation of mathematical
models based on these functions.
b) They assume that people behave rationally, or at least
consistently, and observe what people do, or did, and therefore
derive predictions of what they will do and how well off they will
be, comparatively, when parameters change. This is the "revealed
preference" approach.
In the former case, we may use the theory of consumer be-
havior so developed to construct testable hypotheses of the way
they will behave in the future, and judge the "validity" of the
underlying assumptions and theoretical structures (e.g., "forms"
of utility functions) on the basis of the actually observed be-
havior. In this case one may argue that surveys taken before
parametric changes in one's environment occur, or before decisions
are made even without such changes, will provide "ex ante" in-
formation which may enable the theoretical structures to be modified
and thus be better predictors of results than if events are merely
"allowed" to happen.
However economists have been traditionally skeptical of the
value of many such survey techniques because of their knowledge
of the basic incentives which are believed to motivate behavior.
For example, many experiments have demonstrated the failure of
the "what if" type hypothetical choice results to conform to the
ubiquitous utility theory assumption of "Transitivity of Preferences"
The rationale is that since the subject consumers did not actually
have to make and, live with, their choices, their incentives were
insufficient to get them to make the true choices (i.e., the ones
they really would have made in such an actual choice situtation)
.
An additional confounding factor occurs in situations where the
goods or services under study are not pure "private goods" but
rather exhibit varying degrees of externalities and/or are provided
by the government (at some level) as "public goods". The problem
here is simple: If the amount of a good or service to me is not
diminished by your consumption of it, I'd rather that you pay for
it, or that you be responsible for its existence rather than me. I
have an incentive to hide (to different degrees) my true preferences
in such cases.
Next consider the revealed preference approach. If we wait
until behavior is actually observable to attempt relative utility
calculations [not between consumers, but for an average, or subset
of, consumer (s) ] , we have lost the ability to influence these
utility levels. In addition, many other variables will have also
changed, making it difficult to lay the credit or blame for changes
in satisfaction on the targeted policy variable. Likewise if we
collect only data from past actions, we may have too few data
points from which to generalize and the ceteris paribus conditions
may also have been violated. Thus although it would seem that
surveys could facilitate collection of more data points and then
enhance the probability of accurate predictions, even when based
in large part on the revealed preference approach, the same ob-
jections as noted above regarding the utility theory approach
would then hold in this case.
For these reasons economists have long been hesitant to rely
in any significant way on survey data in the future sense of the
word, that is, where hypothetical situations and questions are
analysed. We as a profession have been more amenable to the use
of surveys to collect data dealing with the present, i.e., factual
augmentation, when files and records are insufficient. However,
some economists certainly have based their research efforts on
survey work. The recognized leader among economists in the develop-
ment and use of survey data is George Katona, who until recently
was research coordinator at the Survey Research Center at the
University of Michigan. His position and proclivities have led
him to differ significantly with the majority of economists in
assessing the purpose and utility of survey research. He has said
that "The primary purpose of surveys are to obtain information on
trends over time and a functional relationship among variables.
This statement has, first, a negative implication: Determination
of a position as it prevails at a given time is not the major
purpose of surveys .... Such findings do not constitute major goals
of survey research and are subject to large errors .... Absolute
measurements represent but the starting point for studies in
Behavioral Economics" [3, p. 409-410].
Katona ' s assertion that "Studies of changes in attitudes and
expectations and their relation to behavior call for the collection
of new data [through surveys]", is tempered by his further state-
ment that "field observations and experiments may supplement the
survey method" [p. 405]. The major assertion however is consistent
with the pioneering work done over the years by the Survey Research
Center in providing information on the attitudes and intentions of
consumers and business decision makers which has proven extremely
useful in formulating macro-economic policy.
In my view the situation is not clear cut at all. As is
usually the case, the use of survey versus non-survey methods to
collect information and data in a variety of problem settings should
be determined by the problem and its setting, and generally will in-
volve some judiciously chosen mix of the two methodologies. Addition-
ally one must distinguish between surveys which collect:
a) Data on physically existing facts (e.g., the shelf-
prices at stores) which do not exist in records or files;
b) Data on non-manipulable individual characteristics
(e.g. , demographics)
;
c) Data which requires a person to recall behavior or
opinions from the past;
d) Data on probable future behavior or expectations.
Certainly the majority of economists have few qualms about
the first two uses of surveys. For example, in my own research,
we have surveyed the catchment population eligible to use military
health care facilities to ascertain the age/sex beneficiary status
in order to derive subgroup utilization rates. Such data does
not exist in the presently structured military health care system.
The problems with these sorts of surveys are mostly technical —
i.e., selecting the correct sample size and its composition to ob-
tain reasonable estimates, and are very amenable to solution.
However there are more serious problems with the latter two
types of surveys. Many times people cannot accurately recall their
behavior or facts about a previous situation. Added to this are
the incentive problems mentioned above associated with motivating
people to answer questions about their future plans/behavior truth-
fully. In addition, Katona has noted that "Survey research is most
reliable if it is directed toward obtaining information on variables
that are widely represented in the universe", [p. 421], agreeing
that, "unlike laboratory experiments, surveys cannot manipulate
independent variables" [p. 423] .
What then would I recommend when it comes right down to the
question of whether we need, or should use, a survey methodology?
Based on my experience and education it seems that we have come to
the juncture of survey and experimental methods. I believe that
what is required is a damper on the "knee-jerk" propensity to write
out a survey instrument everytime we need some data and on the equally
habitual reluctance to incorporate any survey method or data into
research projects. Our best bet is to integrate, in an innovative
and appropriate manner, survey methods where the payoff warrants it.
The questions we may ask are:
a) How should this recommended innovative integration of
survey and non-survey research be determined?; and
b) How is it being done in economic research at the present?
In my opinion, the basic question should be, "What am I try-
ing to do, and what are the feasible ways to do it, and their re-
spective costs and benefits, both monetary and non-monetary?". Each
of us does this implicitly when we seek data and information for our
own use. For example, when searching for a place to buy film for
our camera, we are likely to base our decision on past experience
and a casual perusal of the newspaper ads. However, when searching
for a camera, we may ask friends, known to have purchased one, where
they bought it and if they felt it was a "good buy" . When buying a
specific make of car, we however tend to rely more heavily on rig-
orously collected price data, and may only supplement this with a
friend's opinion. Clearly the greater the cost of making a wrong
decision, the more accurate and objective we want our data to be.
The collective experiential survey data of Consumer Reports , cost-
effectively available, is preferable to a small sample of friends'
opinions for major purchase decisions. However, we would not indi-
vidually attempt to collect such data if Consumer Reports was not
available. It would not be worth it.
In research projects whose outcome is to be a specific policy
recommendation, such costs and benefits, in a probablistic sense,
should be assessed during the research methodology development
stage. The expected value of each feasible strategy will depend on
an assessment of the relative accuracy and reliability of the data
to be so obtained. These factors must be explicitly considered.
There is no way to generalize a specific algorithm in such cases
because there are innumerable unique potential situations. How-
ever, below I describe a couple of examples of recent research pro-
jects which illustrate my points.
Ill . Innovative Use of Modified Survey Methodologies in Economic
Research
As mentioned earlier, there is a major problem in using
survey research in cases where those surveyed have an inherent in-
centive to hide their true feelings or opinions (as contrasted with
situations where there are merely insufficient incentives to assess
them or where significant uncertainty exists) . Thus if in voting
on a bond issue we incorporated a space for those who vote "yes"
to indicate how much they would be willing to pay toward the cost of
providing the facility under consideration, we would expect that
individuals who favor the issue would either vote "no" hoping that
enough others would vote "yes" and be assessed, or would vote "for"
the issue but significantly understate the value they place on having
the facility hoping to minimize the amount of additional tax they
personally would have to pay.
This phenomena has caused great difficulty in the past in
that we collectively have had to rely upon indirect assessments —
i.e., everyone's tax would go up (if approved) by the same marginal
increment. This results in some public goods not being provided
even though a sufficient number of voters might be willing to pay
differing amounts to finance it, because a majority were not willing
to pay the additional stated tax increment. Likewise, even when
bond issues pass, all this indicates is that enough voters were
willing to pay the stated "price", not that the optimal relative tax
burden has been defined.
When voting or otherwise expressing preferences for non-local
public goods, most times there is little direct connection between
passage of such an issue and the cost to the voter. Thus, the
voters or respondents may tend to indicate they favor the adoption
of some policy because they perceive the cost to them to be negli-
gible, or fail to perceive the opportunity cost of passage.
Thus research into the desirability of producing or providing
such public goods has concentrated on the technological aspects and
the associated costs of producing the goods or services and to a
lessor extent on "a priori" utility assessments using utility theory
and revealed preference. The benefits and opportunity cost asses-
sments tend to be left to be debated by opposing sides and are
assumed to be communicated to the population of voters by the media.
The consumer opinions are then "collected" either through monitoring
constituent mail or by allowing an eventual popular vote on the
issue, on an either/or basis only. Although polls may be taken to
assess the general climate of consumer opinion, the polls are not
used (generally) to determine the policy decision directly.
Groves and Ledyard have developed a research methodology [2.]
which is posited to be a useful first step in changing this process.
They have designed a "preference revelation" process, with feedback
to the "voter", which elicits the subjects valuation of the project
under consideration. The major element present here is a penalty/
reward structure for the voter as a result of an indicated decision
or value assessment. While the details are too complex to present
here, the salient point for our purposes is that, recognizing the
inherent difficulties in using a standard survey for value assessment,
they have attempted to construct an incentive mechanism tied to
truthfulness on the survey form to ensure greater accuracy of the
data collected for decision-making. The results of such a perfected
methodology would facilitate a benefit calculation to accompany the
cost estimates of specific public good type projects and would
allow those projects to be chosen which yield maximum benefits as
revealed by the population and which would be financed in a pre-
determined non-homogenous way.
Groves has also related this "Team Theory" work to the problem
of managing a decentralized firm [1.] . It appears that this same
sort of quasi-survey approach with incentives may well have applica-
tion to the management of the Military Health Care Delivery System
under Capitation Budgeting with accompanying structural changes.
The potential for the adoption of a universal enfranchisement
plan — i.e., National Health Insurance (NHI) — to significantly
alter the existing utilization patterns by individuals of the overall
Health Care Delivery System has made it difficult to estimate
accurately the cost of the various competing NHI proposals before
the congress. Our experience with the rapid cost escalation ac-
companying the adoption of Medicare and Medicaid has caused signifi-
cant concern and motivated a desire to know more exactly the probable
financial consequences of NHI implementation.
Existing (natural experimental) data is not sufficient to
accomplish these projections because of the significant differences
in the coverages and real prices of health care to individuals under
NHI vis-a-vis the current patterns of insurance and care. Likewise,
the intricate nature of the decision process which leads to the
observation of a demand for care and the previously discussed
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"public good" aspect associated with NHI [i.e., if NHI passes,
everyone has it not just those who might be willing to pay] are
among the many reasons why a straight-forward survey of individuals
to ask their probable future utilization under various plans is an
inappropriate method to provide answers.
The Rand NHI study, a $32 million project to measure and
predict the effects of price changes on utilization of health care
services was thus designed as a mix of an experimental, randomized
clinical trails type strategy and a survey component. This measure-
ment of the price effect is not simple. "Measurement of the effect
of price on demand can be refined in several ways. For example, we
may wish to know whether the effect of price varies with income and
total expenditure. Do poor families respond more readily to price
than affluent ones? If so, they will benefit differentially from a
generous health insurance plan. Do families with major illnesses
respond differently from those with minor illnesses? If so, esti-
mates of the effect of catastrophic health insurance must be based
only on data from those with such illnesses" [4., p. 6]. Further,
given that we are interested in effects of price changes, changes
in coverage must also be evaluated. "To compute this change, one
must know the current coverage of the population; unfortunately,
detailed information on this subject is rare. National Health
Survey estimates can be used to determine the percentage of the
population with no coverage, but they are not helpful if one wants
to determine the improvement that would be caused by any particular
plan. .. .among persons who now have partial coverage (as most do)"
[4., p. 6]. The Rand study had to fill these gaps, since, for
example. .."... so few of the respondents know the details of their
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policy that the National Health Survey has stopped asking such
questions" [4., p. 9].
After painstaking analysis, the Rand group designed a
5 year experiment in which 3200 families from 4 areas will be
randomly enrolled in variously structured health plans which
systematically vary the net price for health care they face.
Their utilization and expenditure experiences will be carefully
and exhaustively monitored ($5 million' of the budget is for
computer charges) . Although most of the data will be collected
through non-survey methods, surveys do play a significant, and
integral role in the study.
For example, in the participant selection process, 6,000
families from each site, selected from clustered random population
samples were given screening interview surveys. Subsequently
2,000 families were chosen for lengthy personal surveys in accord-
ance with the Morris Finite Selection Model on the basis of the
information gained from the initial screens. Then, based on the
more detailed family specific data gathered in the lengthy surveys,
800 families were selected— 500 for enrollment in the experimental
group, and 300 for the control group using the Conlisk-Watts Model
to choose and distribute the families among the various plans to
minimize non-random variation in the utilization experiences to
be observed. Finally, quarterly surveys of the participants will
provide supplemental and valuation data to that collected directly
during the experiment.
Although there have been many questions raised about
specific aspects of the study, it seems a fair evaluation to state
that the study group, on the basis of rigorous analysis of the
12
potential biases and other problems with the data likely to result,
has taken a significant step toward providing the most useful demand
data yet available, as well as providing an example of an innovative
mix of our two subject research methodologies.
IV. My View of the Future
It seems clear to me that the most valuable empirical research
in the future will utilize a judicious combination of survey and
experimental methodologies. The character of the major social
economic problems facing us and the fact that in our ever more
fine-tuned economy mistakes may impose long term penalties we can
ill afford to pay, seems unambiguously to point to economic research
which integrates the probable reactions of consumers to a greater
extent than ever before. The previous predilection of economists
(and others) to see the problem in a "partial equilibrium" setting
is slowly giving way to a broader perspective in structuring research
to solve seemingly micro scale problems. This will not always in-
volve survey research, and in fact in many instances, may involve
less (or no) such methods in cases where they previously had been
used. But certainly survey research will provide significant bene-
fits, when carefully tailored to the problem at hand.
A final example may best illustrate my point. Without going
into lengthy detail, many, including myself, have recommended that
the Military Health Services System be significantly restructured
to decentralize decision making and provide greater incentives for
cost containment. The major elements of such a system are the use
of capitated budgets for facilities and their providers, increased
authority for local decision makers, regional budgets and resource
responsibility, sharing of the fruits of cost savings with health
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care providers and staffs, and Ceventual) dual choice of enrollment
for the eligible population. The view of the problem taken is thus
clearly holistic and any recommendations for a specific implementa-
tion strategy and associated pilot tests involves many facets. In
particular we recognized that allowing "dual choice" could have
potentially catastrophic fiscal implications if many people decided
to use non-direct facilities and providers (i.e., through CHAMPUS)
as their source of care. Likewise, we realized that giving the pro-
viders positive incentives for cost control as we suggested, could
lead to less acceptable care as evaluated by patients, and thus
further exacerbate the outflow of patients to CHAMPUS enrollment.
It was thus deemed important to track the collective patient as-
sessment of the health care delivery process. This information is
possessed only by the patient and is by nature extremely subjective.
Thus the only way to obtain this data was to ask the patients. For
this reason we have suggested and developed a Patient Satisfaction
Monitoring System. This relies on a random sample encounter-based
survey methodology which provides feedback to the clinic level staff
and indicates areas in which modifications in their behavior might
be productive. This information, in combination with the internal
systemic incentive changes we have suggested, will tend to mitigate
unnecessary enrollment turnover and hence minimize system costs.
The point is that the decision to develop and use such a
survey methodology was made after an analysis of the overall situation
indicated that it was the best way to obtain the patient-subjective
satisfaction data which could have drastically affected system-costs,
14
and hence had to be addressed. Thus, sometimes there are better
alternatives to the use of surveys, sometimes not. The choice of
the tool should be dictated by the nature of the problem—not by
habit or fiat.
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